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Imagination and Existence. Heidegger's Retrieval of the Kantian Ethic. By 
Frank Schalow. Lantham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. Pp xiii 
+ 178 pages. Reviewed by Roy Martinez, Speiman College. 
This is an ambitious book. Besides being tersely written, its arguments 
are neatly constructed. In order to help the reader make an easy transition 
between chapters, the author summarizes each chapter at its conclusion. 
The clarity of language notwithstanding, familiarity with the technical 
terms of Kant and Heidegger is assumed. 
Briefly, the author strives to show that in opposition to Kant, who 
finds it necessary to invoke the eternal in postulating morality, an ethics 
can be established within the framework of time alone. To do this, he 
adopts Heidegger's reading of Kant as formulated in the former's Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics. In addition, to assist him in his reading of 
Heidegger, he subscribes to Charles M. Sherover, author of Heidegger, 
Kant, and Time (Indiana University Press, 1971). The author is careful to 
note, however, that the point he is trying to make is not so much to gainsay 
Kant as to "reconstruct Kant's ethics." This he does by forging a path for 
"thinking about ethics in terms of the temporality of the practical self. 
That is, we see how it is possible to seek the basis for a normative outlook 
within the scope of human finitude, without having to make an additional 
assumption about man's kinship with the eternal" (172). The upshot is that 
practical reason is definable in a manner consonant with Dasein's 
temporality in the sense that it "displays the meaning of finitude in a more 
original way than does theoretical reason" (155). Were the arguments not 
so intricate, it would be interesting to retrace the steps taken by the author 
in building up his case. However, the book is not confined to Kant and 
Heidegger: engaged in the fray are Ernst Cassirer, Soren Kierkegaard, and 
Freidrich Nietzsche. 
Against Cassirer, who maintains a rather conventional interpretation 
of Kant, the author argues that "the unconditioned commands of morality 
hold precisely because of the limitations imposed upon us by our temporal 
natures" (xi). His appeal to Kierkegaard is based on the belief that the 
Danish thinker was important to Heidegger and also because Kierkegaard 
"first provides the clue to a striking omission in Kant's ethics, namely, an 
explanation of the nature of moral commitment" (xii). But the connection 
between Kierkegaard and Heidegger which the author tries to establish is 
not as convincing as would be desirable. The statements made about 
Kierkegaard do not do justice to the complex method of his writing. 
Indeed, when the cards are down, only a few of the standard views of 
Vigilius Haufniensis (about time) and those of Anti-Climacus (about the 
self) are considered. These are then attributed to Kierkegaard without 
taking into account Kierkegaard's serious plea not to confound him with his 
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Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory by Rick Roderick. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 189 pp. Reviewed by Albert Cinelli, 
University of Kansas. 
In Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory, Rick Roderick 
examines the thought of Jiirgen Habermas. He reads Habermas as one who 
attempts to synthesize: Kant, Hegel, Marx, Critical Theory, contemporary 
philosophy of language and linguistics, thus to formulate a philosophical 
social theory. Roderick wants to "do justice to the real tensions in 
Habermas's texts" (3). Part of what generates these tensions is Habermas's 
attempt to put forth an effective foundational social theory in the face of 
the often telling objections of a wide range of antifoundationalists. Indeed, 
Habermas himself is critical of prior attempts to provide ultimate 
foundations for knowledge or political practice. Roderick explains 
Habermas's socio-political foundationalism through an examination of his 
move away from a Marxian "paradigm of production" to a more 
contemporary "paradigm of communication." 
pseudonyms. However, since Heidegger, too, reads Kierkegaard in this 
misleading and partial manner, the shortcoming, I argue, should be 
attributed to him. 
The observation made by Nietzsche that it was the longing for 
permanence which gave rise to metaphysics, which in turn created the 
"self, jibes well with the book's overall project (121). When one identifies 
himself with an enduring substance, the tendency to resist anything that 
threatens its integrity is pervasive. 'The instinct for self-preservation is 
reflected on a metaphysical plane through the belief in the 'after-life'" 
(122). Then the author expatiates on the doctrine of the eternal recurrence 
and the will to power without, surprisingly enough, considering Heidegger's 
own interpretation of Nietzsche. 
Finally, Imagination and Existence, which draws its inspiration from 
Kant, and tries to build a system of ethics based on Heidegger's concept of 
Dasein, is to be commended for its daring and innovative spirit. The task is 
not simple. An ethics, by definition, is anthropological. Hence, to attempt 
an undertaking that would relate Heidegger to an anthropological 
enterprise runs the risk of doing violence to his thought, which is meant to 
be pristinely ontological. Yet, with an ingenuity and careful logical 
reasoning, Frank Schalow is able to construct an argument that, while not 
confuting Kant's dependence on the eternal order renders an ethics 
comprehensible based on the human being's understanding of the possibility 
of his own cessation in time. The question remains, however, whether 
Schalow retrieves Heidegger as compellingly as Heidegger retrieves Kant. 
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The first four chapters of llabermas and the Foundations of Critical 
Theory are concerned with the various stages in the development of 
Habermas's thought, from his early encounter and reconstruction of critical 
theory to his later thought concerned with communication. The final 
chapter is reserved for a broad critical overview. The move from a 
paradigm of production to a paradigm of communication is explained, 
primarily, in the second chapter. According to Habermas, in giving an 
analysis solely in terms of the relations, structures and effects of production, 
Marx cannot provide an adequate base for his concept of a historically 
developing social rationality. To understand how this is rooted in social 
practice, a distinction must be made between humans as tool-making 
animals, and as animals who use language. Out of this Habermas 
formulates a distinction between labor (instrumental action) and interaction 
(communicative reason) (49). In Habermas's social theory, communication, 
as communicative action and rationality, takes over the center stage Marx 
gave to labor. By Roderick's analysis, the move from production to 
communication is necessary for Habermas, so that he can preserve the role of 
reason and rationality in light of the Critical Theorists' critique of 
technocratic, "instrumental reason." 
In the third chapter, Roderick examines Habermas's notions of "the 
ideal speech situation" and "universal pragmatics." Roderick is critical of 
Habermas's notion of an ideal speech situation, whereby democratic 
decision makers can resolve disputes utilizing a language undistorted by 
constraints of domination. Roderick has doubts, first, that the ideal speech 
situation can be anything more than an idea, and second, that, even were it 
not, its application would be far more limited than Habermas requires. 
Roderick finds more favor with Habermas's universal pragmatics, 
according to which, the rational foundation of ethical norms, that which 
gives them their binding character, can be grounded in the universal nature 
of linguistic practices. Roderick, however, does not accept this uncritically. 
He finds, for example, an unresolved tension between a Searlean and 
Chomskian account of meaning. Habermas appears to conflate both theories 
without a rigorous recognition of their contradictory aspects. 
In Chapter Four, Roderick traces the direction of Habermas's thought 
in the early Eighties. The examination is given here in terms of the 
relation of communicative action to rationality and social rationalization. 
Communicative action is what occurs when social practice is guided by "the 
mutual and co-operative achievement of understanding among 
participants," instead of the "egocentric calculations of the success of the 
actor as an individual" (109). Here, Roderick recounts how Habermas has 
moved away from the ideal speech situation toward a more empirically 
grounded consideration of "communicative rationality." The move is made 
to social rationality in terms of the way "the potentialities of 
communication elaborated in his formal account provide an interpretive 
guide which may be used to investigate the level of rationality (scientific. 
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Mediation of Deconstruction, Bernard Lonergan's Method in Philosophy, 
The Argument from Human Operational Development Martin Joseph 
Matustik. New York: University Press of America, 1980. Reviewed by C. 
P.Hodes, University of Kansas. 
Bernard Lonergan's philosophical work is not well known outside 
Catholic philosophical circles. That is a shame, both because he has 
something strikingly new and important to say and because (as I shall argue 
a bit later) his thought suffers from the absence of a thoroughgoing critique 
from philosophers who do not share his religious commitments. As its title 
suggests, Mr. Matustik's book gives us an exposition of Lonergan's 
philosophy from the perspective of his concept of mediation; part of this 
project is a comparison of Lonergan with the deconstructionists—birds of a 
very different philosophical feather. 
This book is a tour de force of Lonergan scholarship, not an introduction 
to his philosophy; hence, those unfamiliar with Lonergan may appreciate 
a little help from this reviewer. Lonergan himself does not introduce his 
thought through the notion of mediation. His proceedure in Insight is as 
follows.' First, one is invited to get puzzled about any problem; Lonergan 
proposes problems in contemporary mathematics and science, but any set of 
data which provoke genuine puzzlement will do. Next, when one has 
worked out the solution, one is invited to get puzzled about the acts he has 
just been engaged in (a mcta-puzzlement heading toward a meta-cognition, 
as the cognitive psychologists would put it). One's response to the first 
1 Lonergan, Bernard, J . F. Insight: A Study of Human 
Understanding. Longmans, Green, & Co., New York, 1957. 
moral, aesthetic) achieved in different societies" (116). Roderick's account 
here is given in clear, careful terms, and should be accessible to those trying 
to get a picture of Habermas' latest thinking of communication. 
The final chapter of Habermas and the Foundations of Criticat Theory 
is perhaps the weakest. Here, Roderick departs from the style of critical 
explanation of the earlier chapters and launches into a mild polemic 
against: Habermas, post-structuralism (in particular, Baudrillard), and 
the ranking of communication over production. His criticisms are good, so 
far as they go. It is difficult, however, when given a number of broadly 
based criticisms in a single chapter, to make any of them count. If Roderick 
does not, in general, agree with Habermas (and it is not certain that he does 
not) then why should he write a book mostly explaining his theories? 
Given these reservations, the book is an excellent explanation and analysis 
of the thought of Jtirgen Habermas. It would serve as a good overview for 
anyone seeking an intelligent explanation of this most important thinker. 
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invitation will be an act of understanding—the perfectly ordinary 
experience of getting puzzled and catching on; one's response to the second 
invitation will be an understanding of that understanding. 
At this point three questions are posed. First, what is one doing when 
one is understanding: what core intentional acts ("operations", in the sense 
common to mathematicians and Piaget) are occurring; what motive is 
essential to the inquiry? Second, why is doing that knowing; what makes it 
count as knowing; would any other significantly different set of acts, 
assembled to satisfy some other desire, count as knowing? The answer to the 
first question is that one is engaged in intrinsically related acts of 
experiencing, inquiring, hypothesizing, and judging (verifying) driven by 
one's detached and disinterested desire to know (just to know), i.e., by 
Aristotle's "wonder". Thus for Lonergan, knowing is not simply taking a 
sensible or conceptual "look"; it is, crucially, getting intellectually 
interested in what one would otherwise be merely experiencing, and doing 
something about that intellectual interest; it is caring whether one's 
understanding of the experience is correct. The answer to the second question 
is that any different account of knowing will necessarily be self-refuting; for 
either it will rely for its cogency on the very structure and motive it is 
rejecting or it will be forced to acknowledge itself to be inexperienced with 
knowing, or bored with uninquiring, or unintelligent, or unconcerned with 
whether the alternative theory is correct. 
Finally, the third question: what is one knowing by the operations of 
experiencing, inquiring, catching on, and verifying? Lonergan argues that 
the structure of the known is isomorphic with the knowing: potency 
corresponds to what is merely experienced, form to what is merely 
hypothesized or supposed, and act (esse) to the judgment that an hypothesis 
is verified. (This will sound familiar to Aristotelians and Thomists.) 
This "Insight into insight" grounds an integrated heuristic account of 
mathematics, science, commonsense, and the various species of philosophy. 
Such hitherto problematic notions as real, being, and objectivity are 
implicitly defined in terms of cognitional structure and dynamics: being, for 
example, is "the object of the disinterested and unrestricted desire to know" 
or , alternatively, "what is intelligently conceived and reasonable 
affirmed." If it is objected that one wants to get beyond what is merely 
immanent in cognitional structure in order to know the world as it is in 
itself, Lonergan will point out that that very desire is part, indeed the 
point, of the dynamics and structure he has been noting. 
I have given a description of how one comes to see what Lonergan is up 
to; but one will not succeed in doing this merely by understanding the 
description; one must perform the cognitional acts described. Lonergan will 
be intelligible only to those (you, the reader) who catch on to the 
implications of their own intellectual curiosity and their own acts of 
catching on. 
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To return to Mr. Matustik's impressive book, Lonergan's "axiom of 
mediation" is as follows: 
Any factor, quality, property, feature, aspect is (1) mediate and may be 
considered to be (2) immediate in the source, origin, ground, basis, and 
(3) mediated in its consequences, effects, derivations, outcome, field of 
influence, radiation, expansion, expression, manifestation, or reflection, 
(p- 6) 
The axiom is viewed as an implicit definition of its terms (The classic case 
of such definition is Hubert's account of lines and points, which picks out 
any set of three entities such that two and only two determine the third and 
vice versa). There is simple mediation (e.g., premises and conclusions), 
mutual mediation (among part of a whole), and self-mediation (e.g., 
development of consciousness through the operations we have been 
discussing). The concept is then applied through cognitional structure to the 
world as isomorphic with it: to classical, statistical, genetic, and 
dialectical method; to the development of individuals and cultures; to 
hermeneutics, etc. 
Mr. Matustik makes a compelling case for the claim that a correct 
understanding of one's knowing, and of the polymorphousness of human 
motives and consciousness which diverts one from knowing, constitutes 
("mediates") a powerful critical and methodological control comparable to 
Kant's, though quite different from it. 
Mr. Matustick also argues that Lonergan's re-analysis of philosophy, 
science, interpretation, and the rest in terms of cognitional structure and 
dynamics is a "deconstruction": 
Lonergan's 'deconstruction' of various human discourses leads to a point 
of assembly—which is not a point but an implicit definition thereof-
mediated through a series of displacements in human operational 
development. His is a 'deconstruction' upwards, i.e., though one's 
appropriation of self-mediating functions. For it is a function t h a t . . . 
can comprise both its variable differentiating and integrative aspects-
and thus be simultaneously "inside" and "outside" the construct^!, (p. 
34) 
By a scrupulous use of quotation marks, Mr. Matustik avoids equivocating on 
'deconstruction', but this reviewer can't help feeling that he misses the 
spirit of deconstructionism, what sets it off most sharply from Lonergan's 
Idea of Being (God)-a timeless, unchanging presence utterly dominating its 
opposites—must remain irretrievably "straight". There seems to be an 
insensitivity to the profoundly intractable ontological, epistemological, 
and logical paradoxes (or near-paradoxes) which partly motivate 
Dcrrida's "double game." Since Hume and Kant, philosophy has been 
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mainly preoccupied with containing the damage to its aspirations incurred 
in attempting, under rigorous standards, the transition from "proportionate" 
to "transcendent" being (to use Lonergan's expressions). Derrida's diffirance 
is in part an invitation to defer / differ the structure which makes such 
philosophical dead-ends objectionable, by deconstructing the very notions of 
structure & objectionable, and indeed by deconstructing deconstruction itself 
(deconstruction "reverberates within itself). By accepting (and rejecting) 
both the "position" and the "counterpositions" diffirance "plays" (the 
opposite of 'operates') between both. This may be more than an excessively 
baroque exercise for French intellectuals; but it is certainly not Lonergan, 
who remains deeply committed to the "position" as development within an 
invariant structure. Perhaps Mr. Matustick should just give Derrida and 
company 'deconstruction'. 
Failure to appreciate the significance for philosophy of its major 
defeats leads Lonergan to blunder in attempting the transition to 
transcendent being and in arguing for certain orthodox religious views: 
antinomies are ignored and arguments are given for free will, the existence 
of God, and a theologically innocuous version of the problem of evil which 
for a good long time have been known to be unsound. These aberrations 
contrast sharply with the uncompromising authenticity with which the 
structure of proportionate being is laid out in the early chapters of Insight. 
Such lapses are not without their irony in a philosophy grounded in an 
authentic commitment to the "pure, unrestricted desire to know." 
However, Mr. Matustik's purpose is expository, not critical, and he is 
not to be faulted for not confronting these issues. As an exposition of 
Lonergan's thought from the perspective of mediation, this book will be 
standard reading of Lonerganians. 
Marcuse and Freedom by Peter Lind. Reviewed by George A. Trey, 
University of Kansas. 
Herbert Marcuse's philosophy is well known both in the United States 
and Europe. Nonetheless, argues Peter Lind in Marcuse and Freedom, one of 
the most important components of his extensive work in social theory is 
often ignored. Lind contends that a central and continuous theme in 
Marcuse's writings is a unique conception of freedom. 
He (Marcuse) suggests that there may be a freedom that is at once 
material and spiritual, individual and communitarian, spontaneous 
and rational. (4) 
Marcuse and Freedom provides a careful historical and theoretical analysis 
of Marcuse's intellectual development. The aim in doing so is to 
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demonstrate that the aforementioned doctrine of freedom binds together all 
of Marcuse's writings. 
Lind begins with an account of the relationships between Marcusc and 
his influences. It is clear that Marcusc is a marxist. The real question 
pertains to the type of marxist he is and the role other thinkers play in his 
writings. In the earliest published essays it is Heidegger's influence that 
shapes Marcuse's marxism. This distanced him from marxist orthodoxy and 
provided a hcrmeneutical methodology that applies both to written texts 
and social phenomena. The product of the Marx-Heidegger synthesis is a 
theory of radical action which overcomes oppressed existence through a 
political transformation of prevailing economic conditions. Lind asserts 
that the early writings provide the initial development of a concept of 
freedom which is rooted in the Heideggerian notion of authentic existence. 
Marcuse diverges from Heidegger by addressing the existential question 
from the social-political perspective of marxism rather than of the solitary 
individual. 
The next major phase in Marcuse's work is directly related to the 
development of the MEGA edition of the collected works of Marx and 
Engels. Volume three of MEGA contains what is now known as The 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. In these fragments Marcuse 
discovered Marx's theory of alienation. He immediately saw this as the 
foundation of marxism. By applying a Heideggerian close reading of the 
most philosophical sections of The Manuscripts Marcuse was able to 
formulate a distinctly marxist theory of freedom. Methodologically 
Marcuse remained indebted to Heidegger, but the theoretical substance was 
provided by the young Marx. The most important publication of this period 
is an essay that deals exclusively with The Manuscripts: 'The Foundations 
of Historical Materialism". This paper, according to Link, is a reference 
point for understanding the concept of freedom that is central to Marcuse's 
work. The theory of radical action is now driven by an idea of liberated, as 
opposed to alienated, labor. Achieving authentic existence is no longer the 
objective of Marcuse's formulation of marxism. This somewhat dubious goal 
is replaced with the quest for emancipated "species being". In Lind's 
estimation, it is this crucial development that guides the remainder of 
Marcuse's work. 
Lind's analysis of Marcuse's influences is extremely helpful for 
understanding his overall theoretical development. Too much emphasis, 
however, is placed on the role of Marx. To be certain, Marcuse is a marxist 
philosopher. But to situate Marx alone at the fulcrum of his thought, and to 
represent other influences such as Heidegger, Freud and Nietzsche as 
peripheral (although important), requires more force than the text allows. 
This creates some problems for Lind's reading of the later writings. 
The remainder of Marcuse and Freedom outlines and analyzes what 
Lind refers to as the "co-operative society" theory. The initial formulation 
of this theory reflects Marcuse's reading of the Manuscripts. As such, labor 
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and work are central issues. In pre-revolutionary capitalist society labor is 
alienated. Laborers working under these conditions are denied full 
participation in the cooperative transformation of nature into civilization. 
The suffering and discontent this generates provides the condition for 
revolution. Lind argues that Marcuse appropriates Marx's understanding of 
these revolutionary economic-political conditions and from them develops a 
theory of human essence based on a free form of labor. This would 
materialize in the co-operative society. Such a society would have a 
productive mode that has a democratic decision making process, full 
participation in the social world and would enhance individual talents 
through cooperative work. Ultimately, this social milieu facilitates the 
realization of human essence as "species being". In the co-operative society, 
Link summarizes, labor is free~"a form of activity which individuals take 
upon themselves with the sole objective of furthering their own goals and 
pursuits" (122). The concept of freedom that emerges from this is a synthesis 
of positive liberalism (such as that of T. H. Green) and marxism: freedom, 
realized in the co-operative society, is power—a capacity to do. 
The second formulation of the co-operative society theory takes place 
during the years when Marcuse is most closely affiliated with the 
"Frankfurt School". Lind points out that his work during this period earned 
Marcuse the reputation as a negative philosopher. To a certain extent this 
is an accurate description; his essays dealt primarily with social and 
political criticism. Lind claims, however, that the critical work in this 
period supplies the reflective basis for a positive conception of a free 
society which appears in the later writings. Marcuse realized that in order 
to posit liberating alternatives to oppressed socio-economic conditions, 
these conditions must first be carefully implicated. This activity takes the 
form of an intensified critique of alienated labor. 
Lind intensifies three key additions to the co-operative society theory 
that were made during this period. First, reason and rationality become 
central categories. This is crucial in that it roots Marcuse firmly in the 
tradition of Hegel and Marx (see Reason and Revolution). And, according to 
Lind, it lengthens the distance between Marcuse and Heidegger. The 
positive theoretical contribution that this enables is based on the 
enlightenment view that reason can change the world: a rationality aimed 
at communitarian, rather than instrumental, objectives will contribute to 
human emancipation. Second, labor must be eliminated in a free society. 
Following Marx, Marcuse does away with any discussion of emancipated 
labor. Labor, in the co-operative society, will be superseded by an activity 
oriented exclusively towards personal and communal gratification. Finally, 
it becomes clear in this period that for Marcuse, critical theory has active 
political content; theory and praxis are complimentary and inseparable. 
From these developments a concept of liberation can be extracted that is 
rooted in the truth of marxism as a rational political theory, the tradition 
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of western-particularly German-philosophy and culture, and, a synthetic 
materialist-idealist concept of human essence. 
The final period is initiated by a number of crucial transitions that had 
a significance effect on Marcuse's work. Most notably, his Frankfurt 
colleagues returned to Germany white Marcuse remained in America. This, 
as Lind points out, has a marked influence upon the ongoing development of 
the co-operative society theory. 
At this point the analysis becomes somewhat forced. Lind, dealing 
primarily with the flamboyant and somewhat Utopian version of the co-
operative society theory found in Eros and Civilization, attempts to 
demonstrate that the slightly outrageous proposal of a society defined by 
an ethic of play and open sexuality represents a reading of Freud that is 
guided by The Manuscripts. This is a plausible interpretation of Eros and 
Civilization, one which Lind argues carefully. However, in order to defend 
the claim that the writings during this period (E&R in particular) represent 
another sequence in the continuous development of Marcuse's marxism, he 
finds it necessary to dismiss another important book. One Dimensional Man, 
as a work that lacks "inner coherence and vision". 
If Lind were to concede that Heidegger's presence was not completely 
eliminated in 1933, and that Nietzsche's and Freud's influences are central 
to the co-operative society theory, an interpretation of Eros and 
Civilization would emerge which does not require that One Dimensional 
Man be discounted. This interpretation would also recognize a sharp 
revision (rather than slow evolution) in Marcuse's marxism. Further, such a 
reading would be more sensitive to the influences (positive and negative) of 
American culture and sub-culture, the disappointment over Soviet marxism 
(see Soviet Marxism) and the primacy of Freud as a source of theoretical 
inspiration. 
Marcuse and Freedom has several features that make it a valuable 
asset to anyone interested in studying Marcuse seriously. A number of tables 
carefully lay out the assumptions and argumentative logic of Marcuse's 
theory. These are helpful as Marcuse is often vague and assumes a 
considerable knowledge of the German philosophical tradition. The book is 
also accompanied by an exhaustive bibliography of both Marcuse's writings 
and the secondary literature. Finally, the text is well organized and 
concisely written. 
Lind's characterization of Marcuse is a carefully documented and 
clearly presented vindication of a unique and important 20th century 
philosopher. His historical approach provides a lucid account of the 
thinkers that influenced Marcuse and the innovative way that he molded 
their methods and ideas into a social theory that is rooted in a positive 
concept of freedom. Rather than reading Marcuse as a new left sage or a 
cynical colleague of Adorno and Horkhcimer, Lind reveals an often ignored 
but important side of his work: his ongoing pursuit of a theory of 
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emancipation. For this reason Lind's book is an important contribution to 
the body of Marcuse literature. 
